RANT: IT'S TIME TO STOP POKING THE BEAR. NOW.

 

   MIT Professor  Theodore Postol

CHECK OUT an interesting vid discussion between “Dialogue Works” podcast host Nima Alkhorshid and MIT professor Ted Postol about Russia’s early warning (EW) radar system. It sounds a bit dry but Professor Postal makes it understandable and enlightening, even for a layman like me. So, why the sudden interest in Russian radar? Recall that in late May a Russian radar station, located hundreds of kilometers inside Russia, in the city of Armavir, part of the Krasnodar Krai Federal District was hit by a Ukrainian drone. The full extent of the damage is unknown at this time. This drone attack follows an earlier one in April that put the radar station in Mordovia out of commission. Russia has about a dozen such installations dispersed throughout the country. Their purpose is to act as an early warning system in the event of incoming ICBMs from America. Let that sink in for a minute. Two attacks on radar stations that are set up to warn Russia of an impending nuclear missile attack!

Q: Why the fuk would anyone with two brain cells to rub together think it’s a good idea to ‘blind’ Russia and keep it from monitoring a quadrant of the sky where, potentially, American ICBMs would fly in a strike against their country? 

A: Obviously, they only have a single brain cell among them. Recall that the Russians have over 5,500 nuclear warheads stockpiled and 1,710 deployed. [The Americans have a similar ratio of stockpiled and deployed warheads. Ed.] If those weapons were ever used then it's time to bend over and kiss your ass goodbye!

 

AS I understand it, the Armavir attack was not sanctioned by the Americans who, apparently, were pissed at the Ukrainians for launching such a dangerous raid. But, it is not clear to me what the Americans (the CIA, the White House, etc.) knew about the attack. And concerning the earlier April drone attack in Mordovia, did the Americans know about that prior to the operation? The fog of war hides liars and truth tellers in equal measure, it seems.   

In the hour long video, Professor Postal discusses the differences between American and Russian Early Warning systems. The Americans have a satellite-based system. Using infra-red detectors, each satellite looks straight down at a quadrant of the earth’s surface. They are programed to recognize the tell-tale blast and trajectory of incoming ICBMs. For example, the system ‘weeds out’ cloud formations reflecting sunlight into the stratosphere. The satellites can distinguish between a snowy mountaintop’s reflected light and an ICBM's launch blast. And the system covers the entire globe. It is not hindered like ground-based radars, which cannot see around the curvature of the earth’s surface. The entire globe is thus monitored by a handful of satellites.

 

    Armivir Radar Installation Attacked by Ukraine

RUSSIA, on the other hand, has limited "over-the-horizon" EW radar capability. The radar station damaged in the April Mordovia attack, is unique and the only one of its kind that uses "the Earth's ionosphere to bounce signals back, stretching detection around the planet's curvature." It can detect:

 

“...incoming threats from thousands of miles away, such as long-range ballistic missiles. It can track the launches of cruise and hyper-sonic missiles and the take-off of aircraft from up to around 1,860 miles away, according to Russian state news agency Tass.” (Newsweek)

 

AS MENTIONED, this installation is part of Russia's ground-based EW system where each station sees a different quadrant of the sky up to the horizon. Think of standing in the middle of a dark room with a flashlight. Point your flashlight directly in front of you. You see the far wall and whatever is between you and the wall. That’s kind of how the Russian system works, with a network of stations each covering a quadrant of air space, and the entire system calibrated to monitor 360° of Russian air space and beyond, horizon to horizon. The Armivir radar array monitored the air space over Europe.

POSTAL notes that Russia does not have the technical wherewithal to design and operate a satellite-based system. He says this is due to “historical reasons” and the different path Russian aerospace research took.* But the crucial difference between the two systems is in the warning time each provides. In a short article for the website "Responsible Statecraft", Professor Postal gives an example: If a cruise missile were launched from the Indian Ocean targeting Moscow, there would be several additional minutes gleaned from a satellite EW system versus ground-based radar Russia currently uses that for the most part cannot see over the horizon. The Russian system is handicapped with a shorter range of detection and less warning time. Obviously, any additional time for Russian leadership to decide whether their country is under attack would be helpful. Those extra minutes could be crucial in deciding actions that could save the world from nuclear Armageddon.

 

Kennedy Cabinet Meeting October, 1962

WE'VE ALL read about the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 when for thirteen days the world was on tenterhooks, and the spectre of nuclear war loomed large. That history is well known. We’ve read about JFK’s and Khruschev’s long-distance diplomacy and how a Russian submariner Vasili Arkhipov, came to be known as “the man who saved the world” when he took the decision not to launch a nuclear-armed torpedo at American warships in the waters off Cuba. And there are examples of nuclear mishaps, false alerts, downed A-Bomb carrying airplanes, etc.

 

    Norwegian Rocket  Blasts Off to Study the Aurora Borealis

A LESSER KNOWN incident occurred on 25 January, 1995 in Norway when a group American and Norwegian scientists launched a rocket into a “high north-bound trajectory” to study the aurora borealis over the Svalbard peninsula. The scientific group notified 30 countries about the launch, but the problem was the Russian Foreign Ministry misinterpreted the notice and assumed the information had been passed on to the military. Which it had not. Russian radar operators were not informed about the Norwegian launch. Additionally, the ground-based radar station tasked with monitoring that particular “air corridor” in which the Norwegian missile was launched was the same one that included the ICBM silos in North Dakota and Wyoming, USA. Again, think of your flashlight in a dark room illuminating the distant wall (i.e., the horizon) and the furniture between you and the wall (the Norwegian research rocket and, further afield, the American ICBM launch sites.) 

 

The "Cheget": Russia's Nuclear "Football"

TO Russian radar operators, the rocket appeared to be heading into Russian territory and its north-bound trajectory seemed to indicate an ICBM launch. An imminent attack warning was  issued, and the Russian equivalent of the American “football” was given to President Yeltsin, who, frighteningly, but according to protocol, armed the launch code mechanism, meaning Russia’s entire nuclear arsenal was just a button-push away from launch.

The Russian radar operators feared the missile—if it was indeed a nuclear attack—would explode at a high altitude 'frying' Russian radar detection equipment as a precursor to a full-scale American launch. Radar technicians tracked the assent of the Norwegian rocket as it reached its apogee and began to fall to earth, having gathered scientific information on the aurora borealis then occurring in the stratosphere. The fact that the Russian radar station did not detect any American ICBM launches in their air corridor, lessened concerns, and the alert status was downgraded. The Norwegian missile, from launch to splash down, was in the air less than half an hour. During that time the launch status for Russia’s nuclear arsenal had been at “highest alert”.

 

MY REASON for presenting this history lesson is to remind us that we’ve been lucky so far. In the last few months, the Ukrainian military launched drone strikes, attacking two Russian early warning stations—both critical infrastructure in Russia’s nuclear deterrence system. Why did they take this dangerous action? Probably the brain trust in Kiev thought it might provoke a major escalation from the Russians, thus forcing America and/or NATO to engage directly with Russian forces to save Ukraine’s bacon. 

 

Ted Postol‘s presentation on the differences between America's space-based EW system and the weaknesses inherent in Russia’s ground based, long-distance radar EW system helps us understand just how reckless Ukraine’s leadership has become when it  attacked the radar stations. Russia's response to Ukraine's attacks deep inside Russian territory has thus far been muted, with little public discussion on the matter. I think a "red line" has been crossed and Russia is ready to take the gloves off, in Ukraine and elsewhere. Putin may opt for asymmetric warfare tactics by,  for example, supplying missile arrays to groups and client states hostile to America that, in turn, will strike American bases in Syria or Iraq, or ships in the Red Sea, for example. Who knows? I'm just glad they didn't push "The Button".😱

 

It was a fascinating discussion by Professor Postol and helpful for anyone interested in seeing that the war in Ukraine does not become even more dangerous than it already is.¹

 

Cheers, Jake._________________________________________________________

 

* While Russia has lagged behind in space-based EW technologies, it developed a working and deployable hyper-sonic missile, which can fly at speeds of several thousand km/hr and are impossible to shoot down. I believe they can be configured to carry nuclear warheads. Currently, the U.S. has yet to develop its own version of the missile.

 

1. Ted Postal offers an interesting suggestion: Since it is in the best interest for all concerned that a nuclear-armed state has as much time as possible to decide whether to launch a retaliatory strike, why not give Russia the technology so it can build its own space-based EW system like the United States? Both countries would be on an even playing field, and be able to monitor each others strategic nuclear sites in a more open and trust-building fashion. Why not, indeed. It certainly would lower stress levels in Moscow, but, don't hold your breath folks. It's a great idea, though.

 

 

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