NEWS OF THE WORLD: UKRAINE EDITION

 

“Man has mounted science, and is now run away with. I firmly believe that before many centuries more, science will be the master of men. The engines he will have invented will be beyond his strength to control. Someday science may have the existence of mankind in its power, and the human race commit suicide, by blowing up the world.”—Henry Adams, 1862*

 

I GUESS, like a lot of people, I was expecting a lot more from the ‘second’ Russian revolution that came and went during the last weekend in June. I blinked and it was gone! Poof!

On Saturday morning a couple of weeks ago I read the news about the Russian oligarch, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and his Wagner troops, and how they were, apparently, marching on Moscow to demand the resignations of the Chief of the General Staff and the defense minister. WTF?! It is true that over the last couple of months Prigozhin has been critical of Russia’s top military brass and the of the level of support his fighters were receiving in eastern Ukraine. But fomenting a rebellion? That’s a bit much. In fact, my bowels turned to ice-water as I envisioned protests in the streets, harsh crackdowns, riots and looting, and President Putin looking down from atop the Kremlin as his country spiraled into chaos. [BTW, a country with the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons and soon to be in the throes of civil war—what could go wrong? Ed.] As bells of doom rang in my ears (I have a touch of tinnitus), I resolved not to watch any news until the next day when I’d be mentally prepared to accept a world grown darker and more dangerous.

So on Sunday I read the news only to find the rebel convoy had turned back; that there was agreement in place to ship the mutineers and their leader off to Belarus to cool off, and the paramilitary organization was to be disbanded. (Note: This had been in the works some time before the mutiny and might have been a factor in why Prigozhin acted the way he did.) The Wagner troops who remained loyal to the state (three-quarters of them remained in their barracks, refusing to accompany Prigozhin) were given the opportunity to retire or to join the regular Russian army. 

And on Monday, a very angry Putin made a speech to the nation condemning the insurrection, calling it a “stab in the back” and those who participated in the action were “traitors”. YET, there were no heads on pikes or villages raised to the ground. Putin’s response was firm but measured. He did not want bloodshed. He did not want to alienate his military, the Russian people or foreign allies by going scorched earth on the rebels. He could have—there were thousands of Russian troops ready to defend the capital, but Putin wanted the matter quickly resolved. So, there were no arrests, even though crews from two Russian helicopters had been killed, along with several Wagner troops. Fortunately, the relatively bloodless rebellion was over in less than twenty-four hours.

STILL, for a couple of days, Western media bloviated on how revolution was in the air in Mother Russia and Putin’s days were numbered, that Ukraine could make significant battlefield gains now that the Slavic giant was stumbling, etc.

 

EXCEPT, the wet dreams of Western elites and their courtiers in the mainstream press were not forthcoming. WHILE the mutiny was an unwelcome development for Putin and could have diverted time, energy, and resources from his military campaign in Ukraine, it’s noteworthy that—throughout Russia—elites, the military, and the Russian people remained solidly behind their president. Putin’s approval ratings were higher than before. Thus, there was no popular support for Prigozhin’s attempted putsch. There was no dancing in the streets as Wagner’s rebel tanks rolled by. No colour revolution was in the offing.¹ 

AND IT'S IMPORTANT to note that Prigohzin's mutiny caused little change in the steady progress Russia’s “special military operation” was making in Ukraine. Recently:

—The Nova Kakhovka dam collapsed in early June causing massive down-steam flooding and environmental damage. Either it was weakened by earlier Ukrainian missile strikes and collapsed, or it was deliberately destroyed. Little changed in the overall dynamic of the war. The concern is that the water reservoir further upstream that supplied water to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) might be compromised.

—Ukrainian drones attacked Moscow, again unsuccessfully.

—THE Ukrainian “counter offensive” has, for the most part, sputtered, with little forward gains, though there are points of contact along the front lines where Ukraine is fighting furiously.

—Ukraine must make important gains on the battlefield to present their case that they are capable of defeating Russia [Not! Ed.] This assurance would justify further assistance from NATO and the Collective West. Additionally, the ever-preachy NATO chief, Jen Stoltenberg, called on all NATO countries to spend at a minimum 2% of GDP on defense.  (Canada spends only 1.39%. Naughty! Naughty!) Bigger defense budgets mean more weapons to Ukraine. Natch!

 

—UKRAINE’S ‘report card’ will be presented at the important NATO summit taking place next week in Vilnius, Lithuania, where several wrenches may be thrown into the peace train’s engine, including providing Ukraine with longer-range missiles, cluster munitions², possibly jets (unlikely), as well as allowing individual NATO members  to send troops into the conflict under bilateral arrangements made between each country and Ukraine, so as to not involve NATO itself in a dangerous, direct confrontation with Russia. But it is NATO that is, for all intents and purposes, fighting Russia (and really it's the U.S. vs. Russia. We all know the score but we pretend we don't know how to add. It's more convenient that way.) Currently, the only NATO member country with a whisper of a military force that's up to the task of entering the fray is Poland. Let's wait and see if they (foolishly) jump in. 

—NATO has become less of a cohesive military alliance and more like a bag of cats. There are divisions in the organization, cracks, and the most obvious one these days concerns how and when and what, etc., they can do to provide Ukraine with enough weapons to keep fighting Russia. I suspect the upcoming summit next week will be a dog's breakfast snarl session. They can't even decide on a new Secretary-General for the place, with Stoldenberg staying on for another year. NATO is a force for instability in the world and the sooner it goes bye-bye, the safer we'll all be.

 

Did you know that NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has just opened an office in Japan. WTF? It's cropping up everywhere these days. What's next, the moon? It's worse than the Scarlet Pimpernel! Once upon a time, NATO was a defensive organization, the West's equivalent of the USSR's Warsaw Pact. Nowadays it's like a bully wandering around from street corner to street corner looking for a fight. It's time surely needs to be past. And pronto! Hey, NATO! You’re in a hole. Why do you keep digging?    

The Vilnius summit will, no doubt, discuss NATO expansion, though Türkiye (Turkey) may well veto the deal around Finland's and Sweden's membership bids unless it gets results from Sweden. Türkiye wants the Nordic country to extradite Turkish nationals living there that it claims are wanted on  terrorism charges. 

 

"Hey, you're not gonna cry now, are you, little feller?"

The July NATO summit will be fascinating to watch. Zelensky has said he will not attend unless there will be guarantees of a ‘roadmap’ for Ukraine’s membership into NATO. He wants jets, too. Probably, he'll get neither, so he might stay home and sulk.

At the summit, will there be any effort to engage with Russia in genuine peace talks, one's acknowledging 'facts on the ground' as well as Russia's red lines? Will NATO compromise? Will it be “Jaw, jaw. Not war, war”? Here’s hoping, but from this crop of so-called ‘statesmen’ I’m not expecting a damn thing. 

 

 —ONE worry is the possibility that Ukraine will bomb the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Zelensky and his officials have been making claims recently that Russia is planning to bomb (their own) NPP as part of a “false flag” operation. I think this meme the Ukrainians pump out about Russia “attacking” the facility that they have overseen for over a year, is wearing a bit thin.  After all, it's was the Ukrainians who shelled it in the past. Chances are if anyone is going to attack the place it's them. (Of course, if you believe Russia blew up the Nord Stream pipeline last September, a pipeline it had built and co-owned with Germany, then, I guess, Russia blowing up the Zaporizhzhia  NPP also makes sense. 

 

And if you believe that load of hokum, well, then, I've got a very nice bridge to sell you….)

THE LAST THING this conflict needs is another Chernobyl churned into the mix, but the Ukrainians might be desperate enough to try. Will a nuclear “incident” at the NPP trigger an “Article Five” response from NATO? The only way Zelensky’s regime lasts out the year is if the conflict can be widened to draw in NATO (i.e., the U.S.) Stay tuned. Keep your Geiger counter close and your hazmat suit closer!  

 

Cheers, Jake.

 

* Quote taken from Gambling with Armageddon by Martin J. Sherman. Alfred A. Knopf. Penguin Random House Canada Limited, Toronto. 2022. Print.

Let’s hope Adams is wrong.

 

1. Commentators suggest Prigozhin’s mutiny strictly concerns his beef with Russia’s military leadership because he was careful to release a statement saying he was NOT attempting to overthrow the government (Just the Defense Ministry, I guess). He demanded that the defense minister Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov step down. Whatever you want to call it, it was an armed insurrection, led by a charismatic, larger-than-life character, along with around three thousand of his troops who gambled on a Quixotic and dangerous protest march (drive, actually) to Moscow. Prigozhin’s recent, vitriolic criticisms of the military high command were in high dungeon and seemingly beyond what most people would think was acceptable in a military hierarchy. And it was puzzling how he could remain in his position as long as he did.

A couple of observations will add clarity to this strange affair:

 —Prigozhin, it must be remembered, was not a military commander—he was the owner of the Wagner Group, a private military contractor like Triple Canopy and Academi (formerly Blackwater) in the United States or the French Foreign Legion. He made millions hiring mercenaries “contractors” for the war in Ukraine, a significant number said to have been taken from prisons. His companies supplied the troops of his organization as well as the Russian military with food and equipment. It was a highly lucrative business for him.

IT should be noted that the Wagner Group, and Prigozhin himself, were popular with the Russian people. The organization was early to the fray following Kiev’s 2013 Maidan coup where Wagner troops worked with the militias of the breakaway provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk as they faced increasing violence from Kiev-sanctioned right-wing militias. During the war in Ukraine, Wagner was instrumental in capturing the long-besieged city of Bakhmut. The organization’s reputation as a strong defender of Russian interests, and Prigozhin’s swaggering, man-of-action persona would have received favorable mention by future Russian historians, except—for whatever reason(s)—he broke ranks with Putin and angered everyday Russians with his rash "March for Justice" mutiny, or protest, or whatever the hell he was planning. By June of this year, Wagner’s days were numbered.

—And, Prigozhin had been told his paramilitary organization would be folded into the regular Russian army by end of summer because, according to Russian law, private militaries cannot legally operate on Russian territory.  Like the French Foreign Legion cannot operate within the borders of metropolitan France and instead is used exclusively for overseas operations (especially Africa) in the service of the French government, Wagner's operations in the Donbas could no longer be sanctioned by the Russian government  once the region became part of Russia; Wagner could operate only outside Russia now, and so it's contract in the Ukraine war was at an end. 

AFTER capturing the important Donetsk city of Bakhmut, Wagner’s troops were to be replaced by regular Russian soldiers. Some commentators have suggested the billionaire-owner pushed the envelope of his remit by deliberately adopting a more aggressive approach in Bakhmut, moving to capture it instead of following Russian battle plans which were defensive and incremental in nature. As some commentators speculate, Bakhmut was 'left open' to draw Ukrainian forces into the “meat grinder” of Russian defenses. Such an overall Russian strategy has worked to deadly effect, causing huge casualty rates for the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine).

—AND PERHAPS as a punishment for those very public arguments he had with his military overseers, and for not sticking with the game plan in Bakhmut, Prigozhin’s lucrative supply contracts with the army would not be renewed. He stood to lose millions if that happens, and this is perhaps another reason, besides wounded pride, for his short-lived mutiny two weekends ago.

—Finally, there is scuttlebutt that says the CIA was aware of Prigozhin’s plans some time before he acted. As were Russian intelligence services. Just what exactly the CIA’s involvement in the Prigozhin affair was remains unclear (there may have been offers made to Prigozhin to incentivize his rebellion—who knows?) But Russia’s spy masters also knew the increasingly unstable Prigozhin was ready to go ‘off-the-reservation’, and so they gave President Putin and his generals the necessary information to manage the play made by "Putin's chef". Using back-channel communications with sympathetic Wagner commanders, the Russian High Command ensured things did not descend into major conflict, with Russians killing Russians. Such an outcome would have been politically damaging for Putin and his government. As a consequence, Prigozhin's half-baked revolution collapsed faster than a deflating soufflé.

ON that weekend in June, Russia garnered support from neighboring Belarus, and it was agreed that Russia’s ally will take in Prigozhin and his rebel troops for the time being. All-in-all, the Russian president managed the crisis with a minimum of bloodshed and in less than a day. And, while it’s not a ‘good look’ for Russia to have an armed insurrection (albeit a small one) on Russian soil, especially at such a critical juncture in the country’s history, nevertheless its overall war effort in Ukraine continued unabated in Russia’s favor despite Prigozhin's weekend hoo-hah.

 

2."Because cluster bombs release many small bomblets over a wide area, they pose risks to civilians both during attacks and afterwards. Unexploded bomblets can kill or maim civilians and/or unintended targets long after a conflict has ended, and are costly to locate and remove.

Since its adoption in 2008, 123 nations have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The United States isn't one of them. The agreement bans the use, production, and transfer of these weapons, which kill indiscriminately and endanger civilians long after conflicts have ended."

   

AS AN ASIDE—I mentioned earlier that Prigozhin recruited men, in part, from prisons to supply troops for his private army. When casualty rates are compared between regular Russian forces and Wagner’s, there is a significant uptick in the later, suggesting military planners viewed Wagner’s troops as more expendable, using them as ‘cannon fodder’ in order to keep their regular forces intact behind the lines. Such are the calculations made in a time of war. 

[BTW I wonder how long Prigozhin’s clock will keep ticking once his time runs out? Just sayin’. Ed.]

 

    "We'd better get it together, man!"

  

 

 

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