BOOK REPORT: THE BUTTON by William J. Perry and Tom Z. Collina

 

I THOUGHT I WOULD WRITE A SHORT REVIEW on William Perry’s and Tom Collina’s THE BUTTON which I read as a follow-up to Daniel Ellsberg’s excellent book The Doomsday Machine, that I reviewed earlier. Ellsberg's book was an account of the time he spent as a nuclear war planner for the Pentagon during the early 1960s. Perry and Collina, in their book, provide additional perspective on the complex and frightening “strategic defence” branch of the American military. Perry was the 19^th Secretary of Defence during the Clinton administration. Prior to that, he was under secretary of defence for research and engineering during Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Tom Collina is the current director of Ploughshares Fund, a well-known NGO promoting nuclear disarmament. In THE BUTTON, they discuss the question of nuclear weapons from both political and activist perspectives, and the authors outline how stockpiles of such horrifically destructive weapons—even the possession of a single such device—by their very existence, act to distort a) governmental policy-making, b) the development of “Command-and-Control” procedures (something Ellsberg discusses in detail), and c) principles and practices guiding international diplomacy.

Since the end of World War II, and in particular since the start of the “Arms Race” in the late 1950s, all of us have lived on a razor’s edge, poised literally minutes away from Armageddon*. Short-sighted and reckless decisions, technical failures, and even blind pride have brought the world, on several occasions, to the brink of nuclear conflict or have made the path to nuclear disarmament and disengagement more difficult. The genie has been let out of the bottle and there’s no putting him back. The best we can do is to put guardrails around his ever granting us that final, terrible wish.

 THE BUTTON begins by outlining the options that every American president since Eisenhower has had concerning when and how they can use nuclear weapons. From nuclear planning discussions* and policy papers (like the ones Ellsberg worked on), since the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the early 1960s, Command-and-Control protocols give any sitting president four ways to launch an attack:

 

“an unprovoked first strike (no international crisis), a pre-emptive first strike (during a crisis when it may be feared the other side is about to strike), a launch on warning of attack (missiles are reportedly headed our way), or a retaliatory attack (after an attack is landed.)” (20)

    

There are two key components: The sole authority for nuclear weapons use rests with the president and, secondly, that the United States has an official “first use” policy (choice #1, above). An additional point concerns the legality of using such weapons:

 

“A presidential nuclear order is lawful and must be obeyed [italics mine] as long as it comes from the president as commander in chief, acting to protect and defend the nation against an actual or imminent attack. Dr. Peter Feaver from Duke University noted that in the world of military officers, ‘there is a presumption that the [nuclear launch] orders are legal.’” (9)

 

This last point has been highlighted in the news recently when, only last week, House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi spoke to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley. She asked the nation’s top military leader to put “guardrails” in place so “this unhinged President” (Trump) could not unilaterally launch a nuclear strike or other military action during his final days in office. (Politico)** Setting aside the drama and politics for a moment, her request illustrates one of the chief dangers inherent in America’s nuclear defence posture, namely that, indeed, a single person (the U.S. president) can, under the right circumstances, be responsible for starting a nuclear war. Secondly, and counter-intuitively, her phone call may act to weaken another important safeguard preventing the wayward use of nuclear weapons, namely civilian oversight. I’ll discuss these two dangers a bit later, but for now I’d like to review how we got to the point where “[w]ithin minutes, the president could unleash the equivalent of ten thousand Hiroshima bombs.” (9)

 

Perry and Collina

Perry and Collina sketch out the history of nuclear weapons, their social, political, ethical (and ecological) ramifications, detailing several frightening events of near usage of the devices in the seventy-five years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They also offer a list of suggestions that politicians can follow to reduce (and hopefully someday eliminate entirely) the chance of nuclear war.

The top-secret “Manhattan Project”, so well known today, began in 1939 when refugee scientists, fleeing European fascism, came to America with word of a “German atomic bomb program.” Eventually headquartered in Los Alamos, NM, the project continued until 1946 with an eventual price tag of twenty-five billion dollars in today’s money. At the end of the war America, with only a handful (literally) of atomic bombs in its arsenal, was the world’s sole nuclear power. Already, strategic planners in Washington drew up plans for their potential use in the future conflict they saw as inevitable between the “West” and Russian (and to a lesser extent, Chinese) communism. First strike options against the USSR’s industrial and military infrastructure, and its major cities were reviewed. It was interesting to learn that Truman, who authorized the bombings on Japan, floated the idea to his advisors about sharing their atomic secrets with the world, and to work with the newly-formed United Nations to create an agency that would monitor and control the production and use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. No one nation would control the course of the nuclear age. Who would have thunk it?!? His pipedream quickly dissipated in the fall-out from the first successful Russian atomic bomb test in 1949. Realpolitik won the day, and the “Cold War” began in earnest. ⁺

 

Bomb Worshippers in Beneath the Planet of the Apes

One aspect of nuclear planning that The Button highlighted for me was the issue of a “first strike” policy. Perry and Collina examine the rationale for this policy that America has maintained since 1950s. Of the nine states that currently possess nuclear weapons, only two, India and China have No First Use (NFU) policies, meaning that they will not strike first in the event of a nuclear exchange, only in retaliation. Russia did have a NFU policy in place since the historic 1982 “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces” (INF) treaty. But in 1993, the new government, concerned their conventional forces were not capable of preventing NATO incursions, adopted a policy like the United States—they would use nuclear weapons in a ‘limited fashion’, if necessary, against conventional forces that threaten their national integrity.

Bomb Altar in Beneath the Planet of the Apes

Hedging your bets and keeping your powder dry, to mix metaphors, is okay in most instances, but not when you’re dealing with nuclear weapons. In 2001, India’s parliament was attacked by Pakistani radicals. Pakistan claims its policy of using nuclear weapons in the event of an attack prevented India from responding militarily in retaliation for the terrorist attack on their capital. Maybe. But what if India had sent their troops across Pakistan’s borders? What would have happened then?

The reasoning for keeping the first use option is obvious—nuke them before they can nuke us. The United States currently has several hundred ICBM missiles located in the central states of Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana. They are in hardened, underground silos and can reach targets inside Russia (and China). They are in the central part of the continent to give them as much time to as possible to launch in the event of incoming enemy missiles. (It takes about half an hour for an ICBM to reach its target.) They are in fixed positions and not on mobile launchers because they have greater accuracy. (Which is a good thing. I don’t think anyone wants to look out of their condo window and see a missile trundling by on its launch carriage!) This system, part of the nuclear defence “triad” of bombers, ICBMs and submarines, makes the first use of nuclear weapons more necessary because of their inherent vulnerability. The Russians know where the U.S. ICBMs are located as does the U.S., the Russian’s missiles. If the Russians launched first, the probabilities are that most U.S. missiles would be destroyed before they can launch (and vice-versa). ICBMs are a ‘legacy’ defence system from the 1960s (when there were many more missiles in silos), and should be phased out, according to Perry and Collina. Their very vulnerability makes for a more itchy 'trigger finger’.

The purpose of having nuclear weapons (in the twisted logic of defence-speak) is deterrence—to deter another nuclear power from attacking with nuclear weapons in the first place. The “Mutually Assured Destruction” or “MAD” principle (called simply “Assured Destruction” in early policy papers) is essential for all strategic nuclear war planning, in that if one side is successful in attacking the other, then the other side, after enduring the nuclear barrage, can still launch a devastating counterstrike that will destroy the attacking side as well. Tit for Tat. Thus, no one wants to actually “checkmate” their opponent as they move their pieces in the game of nuclear chess. As Eisenhower said: “There is nothing in the world that the Communists want badly enough to risk losing the Kremlin.” (25)

Gorbachev, Regan sign INF Treaty 1982

Perry and Collina propose a path of gradual de-escalation with lower alert statuses and protocols, and with longer timelines. If all the nuclear weapon states adopted NFU, for example, that would have two important benefits: First, it would de-escalate tensions between potential nuclear combatants with treaties and agreements and safety protocols (like storage of warheads separate from missiles and bombers to reduce the threat of quick launches, thus giving more time for diplomacy.) Secondly, if the threat of first use by a nuclear power against a non-nuclear power is eliminated through the NFU policy, this would lessen the need for those non-nuclear powers to develop their own nuclear weapons programs to counter potential threats, such as Iran’s fear of an Israeli nuclear strike, or North Korea continuing its nuclear weapons program because of the potential for a first strike from the United States. A comprehensive NFU policy involving ALL the nuclear weapon states would make for a much safer world. 

Dr. Robert Oppenheimer "Father" of the Atom Bomb

Another helpful element for de-escalation would be to eliminate most (or all) strategic ICBM emplacements and to rely on the submarine and bomber ‘legs’ of the nuclear triad which would have more than enough deterrence capability to retaliate. Any successful first strike on the United States, for example, could be met with a devestating reprisal from U.S. submarine-based missile systems and surviving bomber wings, all but assuring the destruction of the attacker’s homeland. Double checkmate. (Though, we really talking about Armageddon.)

"I'm sorry, but you humans are FUCKED!"

Additionally, eliminating the more vulnerable ICBM component of nuclear defence would lessen the need for a quick decision to retaliate. As it stands, a first strike by Russian missiles on America would require a decision by the president to retaliate with ICBMs within minutes of detecting incoming missiles, or risk losing most silo-based weapons. They are simply too slow to activate during a surprise attack. If, instead, policies and systems (such as NFU, secure communications and active submarine-launch capabilities) are in place, then a quick decision to launch is not necessary. Time can be taken to decide whether to retaliate. This, by the way, is not idle speculation. Technical glitches, false radar readings, heated rhetoric, and international conflicts can make playing a game of nuclear ‘chicken’ deadly. For example, in 1995, the launch of a satellite from Norway (a NATO member, BTW) by American and Norwegian scientists triggered an alert in Russia whereby the “nuclear briefcase” was brought to then-president Boris Yeltsin, who had to decide whether to retaliate. Fortunately, observers determined there was no attack.      

Prota Zoey: "I'm not mutated--you're retarded!"

There is much to go ‘into the weeds’ about that Perry and Collina discuss in The Button, but I’ll mention one other issue: the fact that the decision to use nuclear weapons resides in the hands of a single person. This is done so a quick decision can be made in the event of an attack. The image of a blind-drunk Boris Yeltsin having only minutes to decide whether to launch his country’s ICBMs and other nuclear forces against America is terrifying thought. 

There was a similarly disturbing revellation made about President Nixon during his final days in office in 1974:

"Will that be mushrooms with your pizza?"

“Defense Secretary James Schlesinger recalled years later that in the final days of the Nixon presidency he had issued an unprecedented set of orders: If the president gave any nuclear launch order, military commanders should check with either him or Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before executing them. Schlesinger feared that the president, who seemed depressed and was drinking heavily, might order Armageddon. Nixon himself had stoked official fears during a meeting with congressmen during which he reportedly said, 'I can go in my office and pick up a telephone, and in 25 minutes, millions of people will be dead.' Senator Alan Cranston had phoned Schlesinger, warning about 'the need for keeping a berserk president from plunging us into a holocaust.'” (Politico)

 

"Must. Press. Button!"

A sobering memoir, I’m sure you’ll agree. And one way to prevent this is for the United States congress to re-assert its role in deciding whether to go to war. Currently, the U.S. president can decide to attack another country (or launch nuclear weapons) on his or her own initiative. Adding congressional oversight and the requirement for open debate beforehand would be an added buffer and safety valve. It would, in addition, give further incentive for other countries NOT to build their own nuclear arsenals. (There would be less need for nukes because there would be less fear of invasion.)

 Again, from the 2017 Politico article:

 

“There are some nascent efforts to change and update the nation’s nuclear protocols. Rep. Ted Lieu and Sen. Ed Markey introduced legislation in January that would prohibit a president from launching a first nuclear strike absent a congressional declaration of war. “In a crisis with another nuclear-armed country, this policy drastically increases the risk of unintended nuclear escalation,” Markey said at the time. “Neither President Trump, nor any other president, should be allowed to use nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack.” In endorsing the proposal, former Defense Secretary William Perry said, ‘Certainly a decision that momentous for all of civilization should have the kind of checks and balances on executive powers called for by our Constitution.’” (Politico)

"How long have I been in charge? About 5,000 years."

Here I would add the interesting fact that House Speaker Pelosi, last week, spoke with the chief military leader NOT Secretary of Defence Christopher Miller, the civilian tasked with oversight of the military, asking him to prevent President Trump from possibly starting a war or using nuclear weapons in his last days in office. I feel this sets a dangerous precedent, or at least gives further weight to the notion that the military should oversee making decisions about whether to go to war, or to use or not use, nuclear weapons. Again, the full congress should deliberate these momentous decisions in an open debate. There shouldn’t be rushed decisions, or last-minute phone calls to decide these things.

 

It is no coincidence that North Korea accelerated its atomic weapons program after U.S. and NATO forces crushed Mumar Gadafi’s Libya in 2011. Gadafi had given up his WMD program earlier, given up his ‘big stick’ of nuclear deterrence, and as a result, the North Koreans reasoned, his country was invaded; therefore the authorities in  Pyongyang got their own Bomb to prevent the same thing happening to them.

Fortunately, no nuclear-armed state has gone to war with another nuclear power. Yet. Instead, there have been proxy wars, “Cold Wars”, war on the fringes, cyber warfare, financial and trade wars, sanctions. ‘Thankfully’, these have been the only types of conflicts most of us have seen in our lifetimes. We have not yet gone down the path to all out war since the end of the Second World War, nor have we yet accepted the mad nihilism expressed in nuclear war.

Pic of Prayer Flags at Ground Zero

Today, the chances of nuclear war come in the form of cyber-threats to vulnerable command and control systems, in the form of international conflicts where cold wars go hot, in malfunctioning detection systems, weakened treaty and arms-control agreements and mistrust among political leaders, as well as non-state actors acquiring nuclear materials for terrorism purposes. Additionally, there is, I think, a misguided assumption that nuclear war can be “limited”, that one country can launch a "low-yeld" nuclear-armed Cruise missile to deter advancing troops of another country, and quite possibly that other counrty might return the favour. Only a fool would bet that is where it would stop. The genie is indeed let out of the bottle.

 

By expanding and maintaining treaty agreements, like Iran’s nuclear deal and other non-aggression pacts, by disarming and de-platforming strategic and tactical nuclear bombs and missiles; by becoming signatories of the United Nations’ “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, and so on, we can have a safer—and hopefully someday a nuclear weapons free—world.

Remember: Nihilism has no calendar. It has no need for any timeline. It is timeless and exists always, and in all places and hearts—when it is allowed to.

 

Cheers, Jake.

 

 

"I think it might be time to sail away!"

 

Walter Matthau as Dr. Groeteschele

*For a bleak evening of Armageddon-watching, the 1964 movie, Fail Safe, starring Henry Fonda and Walter Matthau is a sure way to get any stragglers to drink their Kool-Aid. Matthau gives a chilling performance as a think-tank advisor to the American president (Fonda) who stares into the abyss far too long.

  

**Unless you’ve been on a space mission with Elon Musk to the dark side of the moon these days, you’ll be aware of some sturm and drang occurring in our great neighbour to the south. President Trump, in his final weeks in office, stirred up a hornet’s nest of controversy with his unwillingness to accept the results of what most observers reckon was fair election where he lost his bid for a second term in office. (It’s over, Donald.; put on your big-boy pants and congratulate the new Prez!) Trump had refused to concede the election up until January 7, when he finally tweeted his concession following the previous day’s riot on Capital Hill. But it was his January 6 appeal to his supporters to take their protest to the steps of the Capital, using language some call an incitement to violence, that presumably prompted Pelosi’s call to General Milley. Trump supporters temporarily stopped the vote-certification ceremony by breaking into the Capital Building and causing damage to Representatives’ offices and facilities. Tragically, several people died during the riot and there were numerous injuries on both sides. Today, there are calls for Trump’s impeachment and/or invoking the 25^th Amendment, which is a provision in the American Constitution that can force a mentally unfit president from office. His finger is on The Button! I hope he reads Perry's and collina's book first. Stay tuned!

  

Churchill Truman Stalin Potsdam 1945

⁺It is also interesting—sadly, though—to note that had Truman shared details of the results of America’s secret atomic bomb project with Stalin during the Potsdam Conference of July, 1945, where he and Churchill met with the Russian leader to discuss post-war Europe and the ongoing war with Japan--had trust been expressed then between the two emerging superpower--we might be living in a very different world today. Stalin knew, through his spy network, that the Americans had the Bomb. Truman’s hesitancy to be open and frank with the Russian leader chilled relations between the two. At the time, suspicions over Russian intentions in Europe were growing, and I think it’s probable that Western military planners envisioned a nuclear-armed America capable of fending off the massive land forces of the Soviet Union they saw as a threat to what was soon to be called “Western Europe.”(Even today, NATO and European leaders are mostly against America adopting a NFU policy. If the two sides ever engage in nuclear conflict, Europe will be destroyed. Madness!)

I think if there had been sincere acknowledgment of Russia’s contribution to the war effort, the “Eastern Front” conflict, which lasted from June 1941 until German capitulation in May, 1945 and costing the USSR an estimated 30 million civilian and military deaths, might have been seen as the real reason for Germany’s defeat, and that the Normandy Invasion and subsequent “Western Front” operations, while costing dearly in blood and steel ultimately were just the coup de grâce that finished the Nazi regime. And, finally, if the Allies had accepted that Russia had legitimate reasons for being wary of the West, having been invaded three times in the last century and a half or so, and therefore needing secure borders and assurances, and buffer zones to protect their lands from a fourth invasion, all of us might be living in a very different world today.  (Even last year’s 75^th year V-E Day celebrations in France, where dignitaries from all over the world attended, failed to acknowledge Russia’s contribution by inviting its president, Vladimir Putin. Russia held its own “Victory Day” parades in remembrance of the end of the war in Europe.)

 

 

 

William J. Perry and Tom Collina, The Button. BenBella Books, Inc., Dallas, TX, 2020.

 

https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/08/pelosi-trump-take-away-nuclear-codes-456529

 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/11/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-richard-nixon-215478